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ESSAY
SOME THOUGHTS ON BIFURCATED SENTENCING IN
NON-CAPITAL FELONY CASES IN VIRGINIA
Thomas D. Horne*
The punishment stage of a jury trial poses a difficult test for
the conflicting attitudes and opinions of individual jurors. In
the search for a mature, well-reasoned, and educated verdict,
an understanding of the sentencing process by those controlling
the flow of information is the best insurance against decisions
which spring from passion, prejudice, and personal bias.' Given
recent legislative changes affecting sentencing in non-capital
felony cases, such an understanding is not susceptible to horn-
book solutions. This paper will attempt to put those changes in
the context of existing sentencing practices and of related evi-
dentiary issues. It is hoped that it will help stimulate critical
thought and serve as a helpful guide.
The role of the jury in determining punishment was unknown
at common law.2 In Virginia, while the jury will establish an
appropriate statutory sanction, the ultimate sentencing decision
remains the function of the trial judge. As the Virginia Court of
Appeals noted,
the punishment as fixed by the jury is not final or absolute,
* Chief Judge, Twentieth Judicial Circuit of Virginia.
1. See Bruce v. Commonwealth, 387 S.E.2d 279, 281 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
2. 1 A.E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 119
(1974).
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since its finding on the proper punishment is subject to
suspension by the trial judge, in whole or in part, on the
basis of any mitigating facts that the convicted defendant
can marshall. The verdict of the jury is the fixing of the
maximum punishment that may be served. Under such
practice, the convicted criminal defendant is entitled to "two
decisions" on the sentence, one by the jury and the other by
the trial judge in the exercise of his statutory right to sus-
pend; his 'ultimate sentence ... does not [therefore] rest
with the jury' alone but is always subject to the control of
the trial judge. This procedure makes the jury's finding
little more than an advisory or first-step decision. Any criti-
cism of jury sentencing because it lacks the objectivity and
principled decision of a judge is thus overcome by the exis-
tence of the power in the trial judge to bring his so-called
superior judgment to bear upon the issue of proper punish-
ment in reaching his decision whether to suspend the sen-
tence or not.
3
Pre-sentence reports, boot camp, substance abuse and youth-
ful offender evaluations, and a host of other mitigating and
rehabilitative services available to an offender are not a proper
subject for consideration by the jury.4 Similarly, sentencing
guidelines are not given to the jury even though the impact of
such guidelines on the eventual sentence may be substantial.5
A defendant's right to allocution prior to sentencing by the trial
judge does not apply at the punishment stage of a jury trial.'
Only relevant, admissible evidence related to punishment may
be considered by the jury.
Being in derogation of the common law, statutes granting to
the jury the power to determine punishment are subject to the
rule of strict construction.7 Prior to recent statutory changes
relating to bifurcated sentencing in felony jury trials, the pun-
ishment fixed by the jury was to reflect only the nature of the
3. Duncan v. Commonwealth, 343 S.E.2d 392, 394 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting
Vines v. Muncy, 553 F.2d 342, 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1977)).
4. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-295 to -316.3 (Michie 1995).
5. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01 (Michie 1995).
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298 (Michie 1995); Bassett v. Commonwealth, 284
S.E.2d 844, 853 (Va. 1981) (holding that a defendant has no right to allocution to
jury).
7. 17 M.J. Statutes § 70 (1994).
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crime and "contemporary values."8 Thus, absent a legislative
mandate, separate evidence of aggravating or mitigating factors
was left for the singular consideration of the trial judge. Recent
legislative changes are likely a reflection of the Virginia Gener-
al Assembly's concern that informed decisions relative to "con-
temporary values" should include certain probative evidence
which, given its prejudicial character, could not, absent bifurca-
tion, properly be placed before the jury. Bifurcation was not
intended as a substitute for the court's power to mitigate pun-
ishment. However, the impact upon trial strategy brought about
by such legislative changes may directly or indirectly lead to
greater uniformity in sentencing practices, consistent with the
desire to establish meaningful and effective voluntary sentenc-
ing guidelines.
In 1994, the General Assembly of Virginia enacted section
19.2-295.1 entitled "Sentencing proceeding by the jury after
conviction of a felony." This change in the method of determin-
ing punishment is procedural only and thus would apply to
offenses committed both before and after the enactment date.'
It is clear that the legislature intended to use the words "pun-
ishment" and "sentencing" interchangeably when describing the
role of the jury in the decision making process. Bifurcation was
not intended as a substitute for the ultimate sentencing deci-
sion of the trial judge. As noted earlier, the General Assembly
did not provide for, or intend, that the jury would in some way
usurp the obligation of the trial court to impose the ultimate
sentence. These changes were an attempt to make jury verdicts
more enlightened. However, the greatest impact of these chang-
es may be in the way in which counsel approach criminal trials.
In a non-bifurcated jury trial, a defendant could use the jury
trial as a means of sheltering himself from the adverse effects
of a prior criminal history. Contrariwise, the Commonwealth
could use punishment decisionaking with blinders to powerful-
ly argue a substantial prison term for serious offenses.
8. Duncan, 343 S.E.2d at 394.
9. Evans v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 114 (Va. 1984) (holding an emergency
change in the statute relative to the same jury fixing punishment in capital cases
was "ameliorative" of prior law); Riley v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 508 (Va. App.
1995).
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Based upon the scant information available on bifurcated
proceedings which have been conducted under the statute, judg-
es have reported that the punishment decisions by juries have,
in large measure, reflected consideration of periods of confine-
ment of less than, or equal to, verdicts prior to the enactment
of section 19.2-295.1. These findings would seem to indicate
that juries (1) give great weight to the nature of the offense in
the decision making process, and (2) tend to give greater weight
to evidence in mitigation, as opposed to aggravation, when
confronted with a separate proceeding relating to punishment.
Jury verdicts relating to punishment, unlike those relating to
guilt or innocence, are advisory only. Although they serve to
limit the punishment which the Court may impose, they are
not entitled to the same weight as a damage verdict or condem-
nation award. However, the impact of such verdicts upon the
criminal justice system, particularly in high profile cases, can-
not be minimized. It is a matter of judicial discretion as to
whether the punishment will be mitigated or alternatives to in-
carceration will be explored.
What follows is a sentence by sentence analysis of the provi-
sions of section 19.2-295.1. While a number of questions are
raised by the review, it is not intended to be exhaustive of the
many problems which may face the trial judge or advocate
during the punishment phase of a bifurcated proceeding.' °
In cases of trial by jury, upon a finding that the defendant is
guilty of a felony, a separate proceeding limited to the ascertain-
ment of punishment shall be held as soon as practicable before
the same jury."
It should be kept in mind that bifurcated punishment pro-
ceedings are limited to felony convictions. Misdemeanor trials
10. The Advisory Committee on Rules of Court has considered a proposed new
Rule 3A:17.1 which has been forwarded to the Virginia Supreme Court. The Commit-
tee has recommended two alternatives as to when an accused may plead guilty. One
version would permit the accused to change his plea to guilty at any time until the
jury returns a verdict on the issue of guilt or innocence. The other would permit
such a change of pleas at any time prior to the return of a verdict as to punishment.
See, 10 VA_ L. WEEK 517 (October 23, 1995).
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Michie 1995).
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continue to be handled as in the past. Where a person is con-
victed of capital murder and another non-capital felony, the
court will be required to conduct a trifurcated proceeding con-
sisting of two penalty phases, one as to the capital murder
charge and the other under the new bifurcated proceeding.'
Whether a misdemeanor charge is tried by itself, or with other
felonies or misdemeanors, the jury is instructed at the same
time as to the elements of the misdemeanor offense and the
permissible range of punishments.
In a bifurcated trial, the same jury which determined guilt is
also called upon to fix an appropriate punishment. The punish-
ment phase should commence as soon as possible after a jury
finding of guilt.' Prior to any additional argument by counsel,
instructions on the permissible range of punishment are given
by the court. It is suggested that, for the same reasons quotient
verdicts are discredited in civil cases, they are prohibited in the
punishment phase of a criminal case. Accordingly, in certain
situations, the trial judge and counsel may wish to consider an
instruction relating to the method by which the jury is to con-
sider the evidence. It is reasonable to assume that a jury may
ask for guidance as to how they are to (1) consider the evidence
and (2) reach a consensus. This level of inquiry may be height-
ened by the prior instructions relating to the burden of proof
and reasonable doubt applicable to the determination of guilt.
It is helpful in considering the issue of bifurcated criminal
jury trials to keep in mind that the "burden of proof' consists of
two elements: a burden of persuasion and a burden of going
forward with the evidence. In determining guilt or innocence, a
jury will apply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to the
evidence introduced by the Commonwealth. This burden of
persuasion never shifts to the defendant. The burden of going
forward with the evidence requires that a party produce
evidence which a reasonable mind could accept as proof of a
fact in issue. Failure to do so will result in an, adverse ruling
12. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264, 19.2-295.1 (Michie 1995).
13. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A.18 (in capital cases as a "continuation of the original
trial").
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on the issue upon which the party has the burden of producing
evidence.'4
The distinction between the burden of persuasion and the
burden of going forward with the evidence blurs the burden of
proof within the context of a bifurcated felony jury trial. It can
be argued that neither party bears the burden of persuasion at
the sentencing stage. Should the Commonwealth elect not to
introduce the prior record of the defendant, or should the de-
fendant have no prior record, the burden of producing evidence
relevant to punishment does not necessarily shift to the defen-
dant. Accordingly, while the orderly trial of the case might
command that the Commonwealth should have the opportunity
to open and close in argument, it does not follow that the pros-
ecution would be given the opportunity of rebuttal.
An instruction along the following lines would be helpful to a
jury in guiding their deliberations. The jury should be charged
with such an instruction only when the guidance of the court is
requested. Relevant portions of the instruction could be tailored
to the specific inquiry of the jury. The instruction might read
as follows:
The Court instructs the jury that, as you have found the
defendant guilty of the offense charged against him, you
must now fix a specific punishment within the limits de-
scribed for you in another instruction of the Court. In de-
termining punishment your verdict must be unanimous. You
should impose such punishment as you feel is just under
the evidence and the instructions of the Court after a full
and fair consideration of the evidence. You are not to con-
cern yourself with what may happen afterwards. In reach-
ing a verdict you may not agree in advance of your delib-
erations to be bound by a quotient verdict. That is, you may
not agree in advance to fix the average of your individual
opinions as to punishment.15
The penalty phase of a criminal proceeding is unlike the trial
of guilt or innocence. There is no default loser or party who
must carry the burden of proof. Neither party may be in a
14. Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Campbell, 372 S.E.2d 411 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
15. Virginia Elec. v. Marks, 78 S.E.2d 677 (Va. 1953); VIRGINIA MODEL JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS, No. 2.700 (1994).
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position to produce any evidence. In such cases, the jury is not
left powerless to return a verdict. Their decision will, in such
cases, reflect the severity of the offense and contemporary val-
ues. The fact that the parties have not sought to introduce
evidence would seem of little consequence to the Court's con-
sideration of the weight to be accorded the jury verdict at the
time of sentencing. While the penalty phase of a non-capital
felony is described as a separate "proceeding," it is nevertheless
dependent upon a finding of guilt. It is suggested that the trial
court cannot limit voir dire or opening statements from a dis-
cussion of the limits of punishment. A court cannot reopen voir
dire to examine the conscience of the jurors as to a given range
of punishments.
At such proceeding, the Commonwealth shall present the
defendant's prior criminal convictions by certified, attested or
exemplified copies of the record of conviction, including adult
convictions and juvenile convictions and adjudications of
delinquency under the laws of any state, the District of
Columbia, the United States or its territories. The
Commonwealth shall provide to the defendant fourteen days
prior to trial notice of its intention to introduce evidence of the
defendant's criminal convictions. Such notice shall include (i)
the date of each prior conviction, (ii) the name and jurisdiction
of the court where each prior conviction was had and (iii) each
offense of which he was convicted. 6
The license granted the Commonwealth to present evidence of
a defendant's prior history of convictions constitutes perhaps
the most dramatic change in the criminal jury system brought
about by the enactment of section 19.2-295.1. As noted earlier,
the provisions of the statute must be narrowly construed. The
statute does not speak to any record of prior criminal involve-
ment, other than convictions. Prior convictions on appeal may
be used.' A conviction may not be used where the defendant
has been found guilty on a plea of not guilty but not sen-
tenced.'" However, a conviction may be used where a defen-
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Michie 1995).
17. Peterson v. Commonwealth, 302 S.E.2d 520 (Va. 1983) (capital case).
18. Dowell v. Commonwealth, 408 S.E.2d 263 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (holding such a
19961 471
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dant has pled guilty but has not been sentenced. 9 A recent
decision of the Court of Appeals would appear to permit con-
sideration of prior uncounseled convictions, whether or not such
convictions resulted in confinement.20 Although an argument
may be fashioned that sentencing information which may be
contained in court orders constituting records of conviction is
both irrelevant and prejudicial; a panel of the Court of Appeals
has approved of the admission of records containing both evi-
dence of the conviction and of the sentence.2 However, trial
judges must be cautioned as to sentencing information which
contains material other than the punishment imposed. As noted
earlier, probation, parole, drug treatment, boot camp, and a
myriad of other tools available to the trial judge at the time of
sentencing are not a concern of the jury.
Records of prior convictions should be redacted to omit sen-
tencing information and any other information, the prejudicial
effect of which outweighs its probative value. A review of cases
dealing with enhanced punishment statutes, while not directly
on point, supports this view.22 A record of criminal convictions,
to be admissible, must be certified, attested, or exemplified. The
Court of Appeals has spoken to the significance of the limita-
tions on these terms in a different context.2'
Records of criminal convictions are not admissible unless
notice to the defendant is given at least fourteen days prior to
the date of the trial. The notice must include the date of each
prior conviction, the name and jurisdiction of the court in which
the defendant was convicted, and the specific offense of which
he was convicted. There is no filing requirement set forth in
conviction not "final" for use for impeachment purposes).
19. Fields v. Commonwealth, 383 S.E.2d 767 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (holding such a
conviction "final" for use for impeachment purposes).
20. Griswold v. Commonwealth, 453 S.E.2d 289 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
21. Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 465 S.E.2d 592 (Va. App. 1996).
22. Hudson v. Commonwealth, 383 S.E.2d 767 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (redacting sen-
tences in unitary trial where prejudicial to the defendant); cf. Bassett, 284 S.E.2d at
853 (holding that in bifurcated capital murder trial where guilt established, sentence
as a result of prior conviction need not be deleted because sentence reflects the gravi-
ty of the offense and the offender's propensity towards violence).
23. See Owens v. Commonwealth, 391 S.E.2d 605 (Va. Ct. App. 1994); Untiedt v.
Commonwealth, 447 S.E.2d 537 (Va. Ct. App. 1994); Nesselrodt v. Commonwealth,
452 S.E.2d 676 (Va. Ct. App. 1994); Driggs v. City of Martinsville, 1995 Va. App.
LEXIS 571 (July 11, 1995).
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the statute.' Accordingly, notice is governed by the general
provisions of sections 1-13.3 and 1-13.3:1, strict conformity to
the notice requirements is required.
Counsel and the court may find it helpful to require that
counsel appear at a conference in advance of trial to consider
the records of conviction, adequacy of notice, and any limitation
on the use of the records at trial. Such a conference may ad-
dress the evidence the defendant and the Commonwealth seek
to introduce relative to punishment. Both parties may, by mo-
tion in limine, or otherwise, narrow the issues relating to the
conviction records. However, it is only "prior to the commence-
ment of the trial" that the Commonwealth is required to pro-
vide the actual photocopies of the certified copies of the
defendant's prior criminal convictions.
Prior to commencement of the trial, the Commonwealth shall
provide to the defendant photocopies of certified copies of the
defendant's prior criminal convictions which it intends to
introduce at sentencing.
25
It is interesting to note that the legislature has at this point
used the terms "punishment" and "sentencing" interchangeably.
This use of words is consistent with the statutory language
used in bifurcated sentencing proceedings in motor vehicle cas-
es, which states: "When any person is found guilty of a traffic
offense, the court or the jury trying the case may consider the
prior traffic record of the defendant before imposing sentence as
provided by law.""
The Court has historically had access to conviction records,
including a detailed pre-sentence report, prior to sentencing.
After the Commonwealth has introduced such evidence of prior
convictions, or if no such evidence is introduced, the defendant
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187 (Michie 1995).
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Michie 1995).
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-943 (Michie 1995) (emphasis added).
1996] 473
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:465
may introduce relevant, admissible evidence related to
punishment.2 7
The provision regarding the admission of evidence related to
punishment will be the most troubling for the trial court. The
changes to the statute effective July 1, 1995, clarify the issue of
whether the defendant may, absent the introduction of the prior
record of the defendant, introduce evidence at the penalty
phase. Nevertheless, the task of determining what is relevant
and admissible is not made any easier.
Although more relaxed rules of evidence are applicable to the
sentencing phase of a criminal trial and to probation revocation
proceedings, the statute does not admit of the use of anything
other than "relevant, admissible evidence relating to punish-
ment" at the penalty phase.28
The first question to be asked is, what is relevant? Clearly,
anything which would serve to explain or rebut the prior crimi-
nal record of the defendant which is introduced by the Com-
monwealth is relevant. However, the statute also allows the
defendant to introduce evidence even absent the introduction of
such a record. The rule of relevancy applicable in the penalty
phase of a traffic proceeding stands in mark contrast to that
which was not specifically addressed in felony cases prior to
July 1, 1995, and after that date, is covered by the general
rubric of relevancy to punishment. Thus, the statute governing
traffic proceedings provides that, "[a]fter the prior traffic record
of the defendant has been introduced, the defendant may be
afforded an opportunity to present evidence limited to showing
the nature of his prior convictions, suspensions, and revoca-
tions."29 Had the legislature intended to similarly limit the
right of the defendant to introduce evidence or the
Commonwealth's right to rebut, it is suggested that it would
have said so.
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Michie 1995).
28. Davis v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 684 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (holding hearsay
evidence admissible in probation violation hearings); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 457
S.E.2d 396 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (holding exclusionary rule not extended to secondary
proceedings, i.e. probation revocation cases, except where officer acts in bad faith).
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-943 (Michie 1994).
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Evidence to be considered must relate to punishment. As
noted earlier, the term "punishment" and "sentence" are used
interchangeably in the statute. Courts have historically consid-
ered a number of factors in the sentencing. These factors gener-
ally relate to the nature of the offense, the characteristics of
the offender, programs available to the defendant, the likelihood
of recidivism, restitution, and sentences in similar cases. The
jury may not consider parole or the use of sentencing guide-
lines. They are limited in their deliberations to the consider-
ation of the permissible punishments provided by statute for
the offense. Thus, evidence of sentencing alternatives is not a
proper subject for consideration by the jury."0
However, there are no specific limitations with respect to
certain other matters before the court at the punishment stage.
One might consider relevant upon the defendant's evidence or
the Commonwealth's rebuttal, if raised by the defendant, such
factors as the range of punishment established by the legisla-
ture, the injury to the victim, the use of a weapon, the extent
of the offender's participation in the offense, the offender's mo-
tive in committing the offense, prior record and rehabilitative
efforts, drug and alcohol use, and age, health, and education. 1
In addition to the requirement that such evidence be rele-
vant, it must also be admissible. The statute does not provide
for a relaxation of the rules of evidence such as in medical
malpractice review panels.32 Accordingly, subject to the notice
provisions of the statute, the traditional rules of evidence would
control the conduct of the penalty phase.
A review of other states' bifurcated sentencing statutes is
helpful in identifying relevant evidence. In Texas, the State and
the defendant may present evidence,
as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing,
including but not limited to the prior criminal record of the
defendant, his general reputation, his character, an opinion
regarding his character, the circumstances of the offense for
which he is being tried, and ... any other evidence of an
30. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-311 (youthful offender), § 19.2-316.1 (boot
camp), § 18.2-254 (drug and alcohol rehabilitation) (Michie 1995).
31. See VIRGINIA CIRcurr COURT JUDGES BENCHBOOK, CRIMINAL 241 (1992).
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.6(2) (Michie 1992).
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extraneous crime or bad act that it is shown beyond a rea-
sonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by the
defendant or for which he could be held criminally responsi-
ble, regardless of whether he has previously been charged
with or finally convicted of the crime or act...
[aldditionally . .. evidence may be offered ... of an adjudi-
cation of delinquency ... ."'
The Texas courts have treated factors to be introduced "in
mitigation of punishment" to be those which have a relationship
to the circumstances of the offense or to the defendant before or
at the time of the offense, and have excluded factors arising
after the offense.'
Tennessee's statute utilizes a scheme of enumerated "en-
hancement factors" and "mitigating factors."35 Among the miti-
gating factors is " ... [amny other factor consistent with the
purposes of this chapter... ""
The penalty phase is described as a "separate proceeding" in
the Virginia statute. Thus, it would appear that witnesses in
the penalty phase would not be precluded from testifying even
though they may have been present in court after a rule on
witnesses had been requested at the trial on the merits of the
charge. The separate nature of the proceedings would also per-
mit counsel to make an opening and closing statement with
respect to the evidence. However, it is clear that the statutory
mandate that the same jury which heard the case should decide
punishment would suggest that voir dire with respect to pun-
ishment should be conducted prior to the trial on the merits.
This would likewise permit reference to sentencing ranges in
the opening statement. It is suggested that in the event the
defendant offers no rebuttal to the criminal history or elects not
to testify, he would be entitled to an instruction to the effect
that his silence in the sentencing phase should not be held
against him, even though he testified in the case in chief."
33. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3 (West 1996).
34. Brown v. State, 674 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
35. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-113, -114, -201 (1995).
36. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-113 (13) (1995).
37. Stewart v. State, 666 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
476 [Vol. 30:465
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With the abolition of parole and the requirement that sen-
tenced prisoners serve a minimum specified period of the sen-
tence imposed, the court may be asked to inform the jury that
a defendant will be required to serve a minimum portion of his
sentence prior to release. This is to be distinguished from the
mandate that the jury may not consider parole or the sentenc-
ing guidelines." Such a consideration is not relevant to the
jury's responsibility to determine an appropriate punishment
and should not be given. Had the legislature intended that the
jury might consider something other than the limits of punish-
ment provided by law for an individual offense, it would have
said so."
Nothing in this section shall prevent the Commonwealth or the
defendant from introducing relevant, admissible evidence in
rebuttal."°
The rules of evidence with respect to the penalty phase are
the same as those applicable to the trial on the merits of the
charge.4' Thus, misconduct for which there is no record of con-
viction may be introduced where otherwise admissible under
existing case law.
Counsel may argue that the use of the word "prior" is de-
scriptive of the time another offense was committed rather than
the date of a conviction. The Commonwealth may wish in re-
buttal to reiterate evidence from the guilt phase of the trial.
Both arguments must fail. As noted earlier, "prior," within the
context of the notice given by the Commonwealth, relates to
convictions, and not to offenses.
38. Eaton v. Commonwealth, 397 S.E.2d 385 (Va. 1990).
39. Cf. Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994) (holding that a jury in
capital murder case is entitled to know the possibility of parole on conviction because
it is relevant to issue of further dangerousness); Wright v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d
361 (Va. 1994); Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 360 (Va. 1994) (holding an
instruction in a capital murder case as to parole eligibility is not required as defen-
dant upon conviction not eligible for parole).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Michie 1995).
41. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (holding that evidence of unadju-
dicated misconduct not constitutionally forbidden); Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 410
S.E.2d 254 (Va. 1991) (holding that evidence of unadjudicated misconduct is permitted
in capital murder cases).
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The penalty phase is not a separate trial, but instead, a
separate proceeding. Any attempt by a party to introduce evi-
dence previously presented at the guilt stage must fail. Howev-
er, counsel would be free to argue such evidence at the penalty
phase of the trial as the jury is permitted to consider evidence
introduced at the merits stage.
If the defendant is found guilty of an offense other than a
felony, punishment shall be fixed as otherwise provided by
law.42
This reiterates the intent of the legislature to permit a sepa-
rate penalty phase, including consideration of the prior record
of the defendant and other relevant and admissible evidence as
to punishment, in the case of a conviction of a felony. Should
the defendant be convicted of a lesser included misdemeanor
offense, the Court would proceed to promptly instruct the jury
on the permitted range of punishments. Its decision would then
be guided by the nature of the offense and contemporary val-
ues. However, as counsel have not had the opportunity to argue
the issue of punishment, it would appear appropriate to permit
both sides to argue, with the Commonwealth opening.
If the sentence on appeal is subsequently set aside or found
invalid solely due to an error in the sentencing proceeding, the
court shall impanel a different jury to ascertain punishment,
unless the defendant, the attorney for the Commonwealth and
the court agree, in the manner provided in §19.2-257, that the
court shall fix punishment.43
Upon the trial of a bifurcated sentencing proceeding, the
statute limits consideration of punishment at the penalty phase
to the same jury which originally heard the case. Errors con-
fined to the sentencing proceeding do not require reversal of the
conviction."
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Michie 1995).
43. Id.
44. Snider v. Cox, 181 S.E.2d 617 (Va. 1971); Harris v. Commonwealth, 408
S.E.2d 599 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
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A different jury is empaneled to impose punishment in the
event of such a reversal either on a motion after verdict or
appeal. Evidence relating to the offense might then be offered
in such a trial where the jury had not heard the evidence in
the case.
May a defendant change his plea to guilty or nolo contendere
after the jury has returned a finding of guilt but before the
commencement of the penalty phase? In a recent decision, the
Court of Appeals appears to have answered this question in the
negative.45 Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution of Virginia
commands that "[i]n criminal cases, the accused may plead
guilty."46 Thus, it may be argued that so long as the court
finds such plea to have been voluntary and intelligently made,
the Defendant should be permitted to tender such plea and
have it accepted, even though the jury has found the defendant
guilty.47
Conclusion
In this paper an attempt has been made to raise issues
which may interest the reader in a more thorough and thought-
ful consideration of the issue of bifurcation in non-capital felony
jury trials. When the jury returns with its punishment decision,
it will hopefully reflect a more balanced decision-a decision
which has been carefully crafted as a result of the application
of the adversarial process to a separate assessment of the of-
fender and of the offense. It is important that the judge and
the lawyers involved in the trial of felony cases in Virginia
realize that they have an obligation to insure that application
of the adversarial process to sentencing is conducted in a forum
which meets both statutory and Constitutional requirements,
and eliminates personal bias and prejudice from the ultimate
45. VA. CONsT. art. 1, § 8.
46. Daye v. Commonwealth, No. 2125-94-1, 1996 VWL 70203 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 20,
1996).
47. Dixon v. Commonwealth, 172 S.E. 277 (Va. 1934) ("[tlhe court had no more
authority to submit the degree of guilt and the question of punishment to be inflicted
upon the accused to a jury for its determination that it had to submit these ques-
tions to any other bystanders for determination." (emphasis added)).
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determination of the limits of punishment for offenders in non-
capital felony prosecutions.
